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Abstract. This paper provides a critique of Bostrom’s concern with existential risks, 
a critique which relies on Adorno and Horkheimer’s interpretation of the Enlightenment. 
Their interpretation is used to elicit the inner contradictions of transhumanist thought 
and to show the invalid premises on which it is based. By first outlining Bostrom’s po-
sition this paper argues that transhumanism reverts to myth in its attempt to surpass 
the human condition. Bostrom’s argument is based on three pillars, Maxipok, Parfitian 
population ethics and a universal notion of general human values. By attempting to 
transcend the human condition, to achieve post-humanity, transhumanism reverts to 
myth. Thus, the aim of this paper is to provide a critical examination of transhumanism 
which elicits its tacit contradictions. It will also be argued that transhumanism’s focus 
on a universal, all-encompassing, notion of humanity (Earth-originating intelligent life) 
neglects any concern with actual lived lives. This absence is problematic because it 
clearly shows that there is a discrepancy, between transhumanism’s claimed concern 
for all of humanity and the practical implications of proposing a universal notion of 
* Certain ideas expressed in this paper has previously been presented at conferences, as in-
dicated in the text. The critique of transhumanism based on Butler’s Adorno Prize Lecture 
were originally conceived as part of a tutorial on existential risks held at the University of 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, supervised by Stefan Niklas. Additionally, I would like to 
thank the research group supervised by Adam Lipszyc, as well as my friend Jakob Stense-
ke, for their critical comments.
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humanity. This paper will conclude, that transhumanism’s lack of concern with actual 
lives is due to its universal and totalising gestures. Gestures which allow for universal 
claims such as general values or Earth-originating intelligent life.
Keywords: critical theory; enlightenment; future; humanity; transhumanism.
The threats posed to humanity has recently shifted from concerns with 
nuclear annihilation (which was the concern during the Cold War) to 
a concern with the threats posed to humanity by e.g. climate change, AI, 
asteroids colliding with Earth, and other perceived global threats. It is with 
these concerns in mind that this article seeks to critique the Transhumanist 
notion of the importance of saving humanity. The structure of the article is 
as follows: firstly, a brief introduction to the development of Transhumanism 
– its origins and current developments, secondly, an examination of Nick 
Bostrom’s claim that the survival of the human species is of paramount 
importance for humanity – humanity ought to be concerned with existential 
risks. This position will then be critiqued using both, Theodor W. Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer’s critique of the myth of enlightenment, and by 
utilising Judith Butler’s notion of greiveblity against the universal notion 
of humanity which is an integral part of the Transhumanist ideology. The 
main gist of the critique levelled against the Transhumanist project is that 
it lacks a concern with actual lives (as opposed to abstract lives) and that it 
in its attempt to transcend the human condition reverts to the myth of the 
grandeur of humanity’s possibilities, the myth of progress.
In A History of Transhumanist Thought (2005a), Bostrom provides a gene-
alogy of transhumanism, arguing that the idea of extending one’s life can be 
traced back to the Epic of Gilgamesh (approx. 1700 B.C.). While stating that 
modern transhumanism began with the publication of Darwin’s Origin of 
Species (1859) and Nietzsche’s conception of the Übermensch, in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra (1883). Both books were pivotal in suggesting an understanding 
of humanity which does not see the current humanity as “the endpoint of 
evolution but rather as a possibly quite early phase” (Bostrom, 2005a, 3). An 
early phase meaning that it is but a stepping stone towards a more conscious 
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development (as is seen in the growing numbers of biohackers) or the natural 
evolution of humanity (Bostrom, 2003). In the years following the second 
world war, science-fiction seems to have caught the imagination of many, 
and writers such as Karel Čapek, Isaac Asimov, Stanisław Lem, and Arthur 
C. Clark (Bostrom, 2005a, 7) became important figures in shaping many 
people’s conception of the future. The book Are you a transhuman? (1989) 
written by FM-2030 (formerly F.M. Esfandiary) and the 1998 founding of 
The World Transhumanist Association, by Bostrom and others, constitutes 
two decisive moments in transhumanist history. The founding of the 
World Transhumanist Association culminated in the publication of the 
transhumanist declaration (HumanitiesPlus, 2009). A declaration of great 
importance for setting out the goals and responsibilities of transhumanism. 
Bostrom (2005a) also goes to great lengths to elaborate on the Enlightenment 
roots of transhumanism. Clearly emphasising both transhumanism’s concern 
with individual liberties and stressing its liberal utilitarian concern for the 
welfare of all humans. A concern which is found in J.S. Mill’s Utilitarianism 
(1863) rather than in the writings of Nietzsche. Such emphasis seems to 
suggest two points, that transhumanism is opposed to eugenics, and that it 
does not condone a totalising state ideology (e.g. fascism or nazism). Such 
a concern surface when Bostrom writes that “The Holocaust left a scar in 
the human psyche” (Bostrom, 2005a, 6). The Holocaust is understood as the 
extreme consequence of eugenics, as perpetrated by the nazis during the 
second world war. This point seems parallel to Adorno’s question, posited 
in Negative Dialectics (1966), how is one to live on after Auschwitz? Bostrom 
understands the enlightenment roots of transhumanism in the broadest 
possible sense, as scientific and cultural progress, and sees the explicit aim 
of this logic to be a transcendence of the human condition. Hence trans-
humanism is a continuation of the Enlightenment project because it seeks 
to develop humanity using science and innovations to better the human 
condition. An understanding of the Enlightenment which is contrasted 
with Adorno and Horkheimer’s interpretation. This critique, together with 
a critique based on the general argument in Butler’s Adorno Prize Lectures 
(2012), forms the critical part of this paper. Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
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interpretation of the Enlightenment can be described as claiming that myth 
and Enlightenment constitutes a dialectical interplay of forces. In their 
book Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) the authors argue that rationality’s 
overcoming of myth is, in fact, a return of the mythical, because it either 
subsumes or discards the non-rational by its totalising gestures. These 
gestures reorganize the mythical as the hidden truth in the secularized 
notion of progress that underlines Enlightenment thought. Opposed to such 
universalism Butler’s argument will discern an absence in transhumanism, 
a lack of concern with particularity, present lives. A lack which shows that 
the goal of transhumanism, to save humanity, is an all-subsuming end, i.e. 
a myth. An end which excludes, or delegates, less priority to all other ends. 
While it might be said that achieving post-humanity is nonproblematic 
because it is a rational wish or the natural telos of evolution, this is not the 
only conception of post-humanity. In The Posthuman (2013) R. Braidotti 
argues for a radically different conception of the post-human. A conception 
which does not understand the post-human as something towards which 
humanity (can) strive. Instead, it is a “qualitative shift” (Braidotti, 2013, 2) 
of what is perceived as being the overarching commonality of the species. As 
such this interpretation differs greatly from the transhumanist perspective 
(see Bostrom 2003). And while a discussion of these two radically different 
conceptions of post-humanity is both interesting and important, it is outside 
of the scope of this paper to provide such a discussion.
Bostrom’s concern depends on three arguments: a typology of risks, 
which leads to the realization that existential risks pose the greatest risk to 
humanity, a maxim to maximize the chance of an okay outcome, and what 
I have previously termed Parfitian population ethics (Højme, 2018. Højme, 
2019). All these arguments can be found in Bostrom’s paper Existential Risk 
Prevention as Global Priority (2013), but also in earlier papers such as The 
Future of Humanity (2009) and Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction 
Scenarios and Related Hazards (2002).
The typology of risk offered is structured along two axes; intensity 
and scope, totalling six categories of risks (Bostrom, 2002, 0–2). Along the 
intensity axis, these are classified as either personal, local or global. While 
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along the other axis each category is conceived of as being either endurable 
or terminal. As examples of these six kinds of risks Bostrom gives the 
following examples: having one’s car stolen (personal-endurable), a fatal 
car crash (personal-terminal), recession in a country (local-endurable), 
genocide (local-terminal), thinning of the ozone layer (global-endurable) and 
X (global-terminal) (Bostrom, 2002, 1). Bostrom later expands the number 
of categories from six to fifteen, renaming the intensity axis scope, and 
scope axis severity (Bostrom, 2013, 17). This is done without any notewor-
thy change to the general argument of what constitutes existential risks. 
Instead, the development simply constitutes a clarification of the typology 
into further subdivisions. Existential risks are the sixth/fifteenth kind, 
classified under the header ‘X’ in both papers. These risks differ from the 
global-endurable kind because they produce “an adverse outcome [which] 
would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and 
drastically curtail its potential” (Bostrom, 2002, 2). Asteroids and comets, 
among other events – e.g. climate change, AI or nuclear war – could cause 
such an extinction. While the threat of these risks is not neglected, Bos-
trom argues that it is in fact technology which currently poses the biggest 
threat to humanity. “The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural 
detonation of an atomic bomb” (Ibid.), since which the threats posed to 
humanity by technology have only increased. The main thrust of Bostrom’s 
argument seems to be that there is a need for proactive action in the case 
of existential risks, because “Our approach to existential risks cannot be 
one of trial-and-error.” (Ibid. 3). In the case of existential risks, humanity 
cannot learn from its errors, because such errors foreclose, or annihilates, 
the future. Additionally, existential risks are international, and as such we 
cannot let national policies dictate our reaction to these risks. This means 
that “Reductions in existential risks are global public goods” (Ibid. 4), and the 
reduction of these risks would benefit all of humanity. Saving current, and 
future, generations from extinction by reducing the likelihood of existential 
risks amounts to creating a utility surplus much greater than would, for 
example, saving the lives of 10,000 people a year by inventing a new airbag. 
This is what was meant by Parfitian population ethics. When claiming that 
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a fatal car crash is less severe than the extinction of humanity, it proposes 
that humanity ought to be more concerned with existential risks than car 
crashes. The rationale behind this argument is taken directly from Derek 
Parfit’s claim that: an event which exterminates humanity is worse than an 
event that ‘only’ annihilates 99.9% of the population (Bostrom, 2013, 17–18, 
Parfit, 1984, 453). If Parfit is correct in this assumption, and Bostrom clearly 
thinks this is the case; humanity ought to avoid extinction at all costs since 
extinction is infinitely worse than the loss of 99.9…% of humanity. This 
claim thus forms an important premise for Bostrom’s claim that humanity 
ought to prioritise a reduction in the likelihood of existential risks. 
Further expanding on the notion of existential risks, Bostrom offers 
a taxonomy of the different categories of existential risks. Postulating four 
general categories, each with numerous secondary kinds, a description of 
which is omitted because the main concern of this paper is a detailed, but 
not an extensive outline of existential risks.
Bangs – Earth-originating intelligent life goes extinct in relatively sudden 
disaster resulting from either an accident or a deliberate act of destruction.
Crunches – The potential of humankind to develop into posthumanity is per-
manently thwarted although human life continues in some form.
Shrieks – Some form of posthumanity is attained but it is an extremely narrow 
band of what is possible and desirable.
Whimpers – A posthuman civilization arises but evolves in a direction that leads 
gradually but irrevocably to either the complete disappearance of the things we 
value or to a state where those things are realized to only a minuscule degree 
of what could have been achieved (Bostrom, 2002, 5).
So far, the primary example of existential risks has been bangs. But each 
kind of existential risks constitutes a calamity for humanity because they 
either curtail the transhumanist agenda, of achieving posthumanism, or 
wipe out humanity before this condition is reached. Such prospects led 
Bostrom to propose a maxim to guide our prioritization when choosing 
which risks should be awarded most attention. A maxim which depends 
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on Parfitian population ethics as previously described. Bostrom names 
this maxim Maxipok and proposes that humanity adopt a stance towards 
existential risks of always trying to “Maximise the probability of an ‘OK 
outcome’, where an OK outcome is any outcome that avoids existential 
catastrophe” (Bostrom, 2013, 19). This does not mean that Maxipok is an 
imperative maxim; instead, it is a rule of thumb. This seems to be a tactical 
move because it is treated elsewhere as an imperative:
usefulness [as a way of deciding between options] is as an aid to prioritisation. 
[Because] Unrestricted altruism is not so common that we can afford to fritter 
it away on a plethora of feel-good projects of suboptimal efficacy. If benefiting 
humanity by increasing existential safety achieves expected good on a scale 
many orders of magnitude greater than that of alternative contributions, we 
would do well to focus on this most efficient philanthropy (Ibid. 19).
This statement does, provoke one to question whether the argument is not 
construed to make sure that Maxipok always comes out being the most rea-
sonable of choices? Chiefly because Maxipok’s underlining validity is based 
on Parfitian population ethics, which in turn seems to play a (arbitrary) 
numbers game which can only lead to the conclusion Bostrom wishes for. 
Thus, Bostrom’s claim that it is a rule of thumb seems more like a ruse 
against criticism of the rule’s inherent primacy given to the mitigation of 
existential risks. A primacy which facilitates a lack of interest in the lives 
currently lived.
So far in this paper, the usage of humanity and Earth-originating 
intelligent life has been synonymous, but it is important if one is to under-
stand Bostrom’s concern that these two concepts are differentiated. While 
humanity is conceived of, in the classic sense of the word, as homo sapiens, 
Bostrom’s argument is rather concerned with Earth-originating intelligent 
life, because “there is no reason to suppose that the biological species 
concept tracks what we have reason to value” (Ibid. 20). This paper will not 
engage in the discussion of the classification of current humanity, even if 
others (including transhumanists) are engaged in these discussions (see e.g. 
the notion of homo sapiens technologicus [Kermisch, 2011. Delicata 2018.]). 
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To encompass such diverse views of humanity, and what it might become in 
the future, Bostrom proposes using the term Earth-originating intelligent 
life (a term which includes future possible developments/evolution of 
humanity), as opposed to the more limited notion of humanity (as it is used 
colloquially). Such a proposition is open to the following criticism: What 
are the values which could be shared by future kinds of ‘humanity’? Bostrom 
suggests a broadening of the concern for humanity which also includes 
future conditions. Conditions which might be unimaginable in the present 
or noncompatible with our current views on what constitutes humanity. By 
framing the argument in this way Bostrom seems to safeguard against critics 
who either do not believe there is such a notion as humanity or critics who 
(like the transhumanists themselves) see the purpose of humanity as being 
a transcendence of this condition.
Taking up the discussion of values in the book Superintelligence (Bostrom, 
2014a), Bostrom argues that it might be important for a superintelligence 
to learn the values of humanity. While it is possible to create a program 
with certain capabilities (see capabilities approach, Bostrom, 2014a, 2014b), 
meaning that the superintelligence comes programmed with allowed 
or barred actions for specific scenarios, such a comprehensive program 
would be an impossible task to code (Bostrom, 2014a, 282). Thus, it is a far 
better solution to teach a superintelligence the general values of humanity 
(for a thorough discussion of the problem of value-loading see Bostrom, 
2014b). There are, however, problems with teaching superintelligence 
the general values of humanity. One of the chief problems would be that 
humans hold diverse and sometimes immensely complex values (even if 
they seem simple to us, these values might be very complex to describe in 
code). Another problem is that of translating ordinary language into code 
(Bostrom, 2014a, 283). Both problems suggest that “we cannot transfer 
human values into an AI by typing … representations in computer code” 
(Ibid. 284). By analysing different schemes for solving these problems 
Bostrom argues that some schemes are potentially useful, while others 
are conceived as being ill-suited for this purpose. While this discussion is 
interesting, our present concern limits us to Bostrom’s attempt at finding 
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a criterion for choosing values (Ibid. 209–227). Here Bostrom posits that 
there is “No ethical theory [which] commands majority support among 
philosophers, so most philosophers must be wrong [regarding ethical issues] 
… [Thus, it is] Very likely, [that] we are still labouring under one or more 
grave moral misconceptions” (Ibid. 318). As a solution to this problem, 
Bostrom suggests that humanity takes up “indirect normativity … [because] 
we may not know what we truly want … [thus,] we would delegate some of 
the cognitive work required for value selection to the superintelligence” 
(Ibid. 319). A solution ‘similar’ to Bostrom’s seems to have been ‘proposed’ 
by Douglas Adams in The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (Adams, 2003). 
Here a supercomputer is tasked with finding the answer to the somewhat 
underdetermined question ‘of life, the universe and everything’. However, 
this does seem to come with its own issue of, how will the computer know 
what the question is? In Adams’ book, the answer ‘forty-two’ does not satisfy 
those who asked the question (philosophers). Hence, this issue suggests 
that even a superintelligence might not be able to help us find the answer 
to the ultimate question, let alone to the question of which values should 
have priority for Earth-originating intelligent life. This is a problem that 
Bostrom is aware of, stipulating that it might be advantageous to review any 
suggestions of the superintelligence. “The main purpose of ratification would 
be to reduce the probability of catastrophic error. In general, it seems wise 
to aim at minimizing the risk for catastrophic error” (Bostrom, 2014a, 345). 
But if human revision is needed, then how does this solution solve the problem 
of diverse interpretations of which values are to be prioritised? Moreover, this 
would make the superintelligence subordinate to the fallibility of human 
knowledge. Once again, we arrive back at the original question: Which values 
are the most important for humanity? And how do we determine this? What has 
been shown so far, is that the lack of a precise understanding of which values 
are to take priority, coupled with the arbitrariness of Parfitian population 
ethics, makes the concerns of transhumanism rather normative. Normative 
because the argument for the priority of existential risks suggests that there 
are universal values. Values which overrides other, less important concerns. 
This means that transhumanism’s aim to ‘cheat’ death, to avoid extinction 
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of Earth-originating intelligent life, is conceived of as the essential telos of 
humanity/Earth-originating intelligent life. As a critique of this position, 
I will offer an alternative interpretation of the Enlightenment, posited 
by Adorno and Horkheimer. In addition to this, a critique of the lack of 
concern with the actual lived lives is offered, based on Butler’s conception 
of greiveblity, this critique revolves around the question: Whose survival is 
it Bostrom is concerned with? 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s interpretation of the Enlightenment was an 
attempt to dispel metaphysical truth claims. They demonstrated how the 
Enlightenment’s demystification of a priori categories, reverted to myth by 
stipulating new universal categories – “human rights then fare no better than 
the older universals … Enlightenment is totalitarian” (Adorno & Horkheimer, 
2002, 3–4). Hence, the Enlightenment became as totalitarian as the myths 
it dispelled, by relying on “identification … thinking that tolerates nothing 
outside it” (Adorno, 1990, 172). For Adorno and Horkheimer the human 
endeavour to live without fear becomes a wish for absolute knowledge, it 
attempts to unify everything within the realm of what is known. Leaving 
nothing outside of its epistemological sphere, except non-existence, the 
Enlightenment seeks an “immanence of positivism … since the mere idea 
of the ‘outside’ is the real source of fear” (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002, 11). 
The Enlightenment was poised to revert to myth the moment it attempted 
to break the mythical spell. By postulating all to be knowledgeable, ratio-
nalization made supreme knowledge of mathematical knowledge, which 
in turn became a (new) myth to suppress humanity. “[The] enlightenment 
believes itself safe from the return of the mythical. It equates thought with 
mathematics. The latter is thereby cut loose, as it were, turned into an abso-
lute authority” (Ibid. 18). Understanding the Enlightenment in this way, and 
it is my suggestion that we should, Bostrom’s notion of universal values is 
a case of the Enlightenment reverting to the mythical. Parfitian population 
ethics is an instance of absolute mathematical truth par excellence. It is this 
rationalized mathematical truth that provides the premise for the priority 
given to existential risks. An idealising which makes existential risks the 
prima farcie (absolute) concern of humanity. If Parfitian population ethics 
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are called into question, the primacy of existential risks loses its claim to 
universal validity. Additionally, by unifying humanity under the broader 
header of Earth-originating intelligent life, transhumanism’s concern with 
salvation becomes another ‘act’ of subjection because “the oppression of 
society always bears the features of oppression by a collective” (Ibid. 16). 
Hence, the claim that transhumanism has its roots in the Enlightenment 
comes to mean that transhumanism’s idea of the progress, or transcendence 
of, the human condition is built on a myth, the myth of a unified category of 
humanity which can be transcended. Criticising such universal conceptions 
Adorno stipulates that: “objects do not go into their concepts without 
leaving a remainder … it indicates the untruth of identity” (Adorno, 1990, 
5). This means that universal concepts – human rights, Earth-originating 
intelligent life, and others – elicit their own untruth. The remainder left 
outside suggests another critique of Bostrom’s project, a critique which can 
be gleaned from Butler’s Adorno Prize Lecture: Can One Lead a Good Life 
in a Bad Life? (Butler, 2012). 
Butler’s main thrust is an inquiry into what demarcates lives as being 
worth living. Butler suggests that grievability is paramount in such an 
inquiry, defining grievability as: “[If] I have no certainty that I will have 
food or shelter, or that no social network or institution would catch me 
if I fall, then I come to belong to the ungrievable” (Ibid. 10). Hence, a life 
worth living is a life that would constitute a loss if lost. This is, however, 
not the case of all lives, since “One can survive without being able to live 
one’s life. And in some cases, it surely does not seem worth it to survive 
under such conditions” (Ibid. 15). This suggests two critiques of Bostrom’s 
concern with existential risks. First, it suggests that there is an issue of who 
will survive. Second, it shows the agenda’s complete disassociation with 
a concern for ungrievable lives. Bostrom attempts to mitigate such criticism 
by claiming that if “someone is excluded from the original extrapolation 
base [this] does not mean that their wishes and well-being are disregarded 
… Nevertheless, it is possible that the interests of those who are included … 
would be accommodated to a greater degree than the interest of outsiders” 
(Bostrom, 2014a, 328). Claiming that exclusion does not entail disregard 
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for wishes and well-being does not pass muster. Affording Bostrom the 
benefit of the doubt, it might be the case for those who are not included, but 
the excluded are never subsumed under the universal, so their wishes and 
desires can hardly be counted as acknowledged. More directly connected 
with the overall topic of transhumanism, we find Adorno’s comment at the 
end of Negative Dialectics which states that: “Theologians have been unable 
to refrain from childishly pondering the consequences of rocket trips for 
their Christology, and the other way round, the infantile interest in space 
travel brings to light the infantilism that is latent in messages of salvation” 
(Adorno, 1990, 399). This infantilism, in Adorno’s words, can be paraphrased 
as an attempt to transcend, move beyond, or surpass the reality of lived life. 
It is a mere distraction from the facts of late capitalism which cannot fulfil 
what it promised: salvation from nature, death and calamity.
The critical points raised in this paper are based on certain shortcomings 
inherent to Bostrom’s propositions: the universal conception of Earth-orig-
inating intelligent life, the claim of universally values of humanity, and 
a lack of concern with those lives (currently) deemed unworthy of living. 
For the sake of argument, let’s imagine that an asteroid was about to hit the 
Earth in six months and that the only option for humanity to survive would 
be to send spacecrafts from Earth to start a colony elsewhere. Would it not 
be overly optimistic to think that an attempt at selection would be concerned 
with saving the most diverse representations of humanity? Would it not rather 
be more realistic to suppose that the majority of those aboard would be those 
wealthy, powerful or connected enough to secure access to, or buy, seats on 
the limited spacecrafts available? Such a claim does not seem far-fetched 
as governments during the Cold War had contingency plans prioritising 
the survival of VIPs, royalty, government officials and the top brass, in the 
eventuality of limited or all-out nuclear war (see e.g. Vice, 2017). Trans-
humanism might seem like a step towards a utopian dream, of securing 
the preservation and continuation of Earth-originating intelligent life. 
As was the case with the Enlightenment, transhumanism, by naturalising 
humanity’s linear progression towards a post-human condition, reverts to 
a secularised version of a universal telos of humanity. Such a vision is not 
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utopian, it is mythical. Instead “Utopia would be above identity and above 
contradiction; it would be a togetherness of diversity” (Adorno, 1990, 150). 
Hence, if transhumanism really seeks a utopian future, this is not to be 
found in a transcendence of the human condition. Instead, it is to be found 
where the object comes to be non-identical with its concept. This seems 
to offer a suggestion for the transhumanist endeavour; namely, that it’s 
critical potential should be sought where transhumanism shows the inner 
untruth of the current conception of humanity. Such a reorganisation would 
be relieved of totalising gestures, and thus it might provide a glimpse of 
post-humanity which would not posit any exact visions of the future. It would 
provide glimmers of what the future could be, flickers of utopian maybes.
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